


Discussion of
Exorbitant Privilege Gained and Lost: Fiscal Implications
by Chen, Jiang, Lustig, van Nieuwerburgh, and Xialoan

Francisco Roldán
IMF

Fiscal Policy in an Era of High Debt
IMF, April 2023

The views expressed herein are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the IMF,
its Executive Board, or its management.

Debt Sustainability vs Fiscal Capacity

$$D_{t+1} = D_t(1 + r_t) - PB_t$$


IMF's SRDSF

- Divide through by GDP

$$d_{t+1} = d_t \left(\frac{1 + r_t}{1 + g_t} \right) - \frac{pb_t}{1 + g_t}$$

- Sophisticated r_t : maturity, currency, inflation, etc
- Get distributions for $\{r_t, g_t, pb_t, d_t\}$
- Probability of debt-stabilizing primary balance?


This paper

- Iterate forward

$$D_t = \mathbb{E}_t \left[\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} M_{t,t+j}^{\$} PB_{t+j} \right]$$

- Distributions, probabilities, risk premia all **implicit** in NPV with stochastic discount factors
- Find *appropriate* SDFs

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
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Finding an appropriate stochastic discount factor

$$D_t = \mathbb{E}_t \left[\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} M_{t,t+j}^{\$} (T_{t+j} - G_{t+j}) \right] = P_t^T - P_t^G$$

- One PDV of taxes, one PDV of spending \longrightarrow Think of those as asset prices
- **Decompose** into short risk-free (not special) rate, term premium, risk premium
- Proxy risk premium with risk premium of **GDP**
- Proxy GDP risk premium through stock market: **leverage**
- Procedure for steady-state as well as dynamics

US post-WWII: fiscal capacity = **9.4%** of GDP

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What belongs in the IGBC?

What does holding the **special** asset give you apart from a pecuniary return?

- Bonds-in-utility function?
- Regulation?
 - ... Banks demand it for compliance reasons
- Institutions?
 - ... Can post the asset as collateral
- In equilibrium, supply of special asset related to **multiplier** (or marginal utility for BIU)
 - ... Monopolist understands this: market power (Choi-Kirpalani-Perez '22), no overmining the bubble (Reis '21; Brunnermeier-Merkel-Sannikov '22; Willems-Zettelmeyer '22)

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
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Issuing “the” safe debt requires
issuing safe debt

U.S. in the 1800s: the long end

- US **consols** at 150-200bps over UK consols in 1790-1840 (outside wars)
- US policymakers (esp. Hamilton) assume this reflected **default** risk



Source: Payne, Szoke, Hall, and Sargent (2022)

How much can US default risk explain?

Simple back-of-the-envelope calculation

- Assume constant probability of default p iid each year
- Price of consol with coupon $\kappa = 1/\beta - 1$

$$q^* = \beta(\kappa + q^*) \quad \implies \quad q^* = 1 \quad \text{(U.K.)}$$

$$q_t = \beta \mathbb{E}_t [(1 - d_{t+1})(\kappa + q_{t+1})] = \beta(1 - p)(\kappa + q_{t+1}) \quad \text{(U.S.)}$$

- Choose β so yield on U.K. consols = 400bps
- Move p and keep track of \mathbb{P} (no default in 1790-1840)

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
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How much can US default risk explain?

With rational-expectations, deep-pocket, risk-neutral lenders: how to discipline p ?



How much can US default risk explain? (with robustness)

- Same exercise
- But now lenders mistrust their approximating model and seek robust decision rules
 - ... Pouzo and Presno (2016), Roch and Roldán (2023), based on Hansen and Sargent (2001)

$$q_t = \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[\frac{\exp(-\theta v_{t+1})}{\mathbb{E}_t [\exp(-\theta v_{t+1})]} (1 - d_{t+1})(\kappa + q_{t+1}) \right]$$

- Stochastic discount factor summarizes a worst-case model feared by lenders
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
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
How much can US default risk explain? (with robustness)

With robustness, varying the actual default probability p , staying above 20% DEP




How much can US default risk explain? (with robustness and extreme p)

Can make $p \rightarrow 0$, increase robustness, and generate spreads with acceptable DEPs



How much can US default risk explain? (with rational expectations and DEPs)

Rational expectations + DEP against $p_0 \sim 0$: cut the robustness middleman



Concluding remarks

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- “Make More Stuff Endogenous”

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
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
Interbellum period, Rational Expectations

For 1790–1914, targetting average spread of 110bps



Interbellum period, Robustness

Keeping $p < 0.17\%$, varying robustness (above 20% detection-error probability)



Interbellum period, Rational Expectations with DEPs

For 1790–1914, varying p to stay above 20% DEP against $p_0 \sim 0$

